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I. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS
A. ISSUES*
On October 9, 2005, the Iraqi Presidency Council, pursuant to the approval by the
Transitional National Assembly, adopted the Statute of the Iraqi High Tribunal (“IHT Statute”)
and established the Iraqi High Tribunal (“IHT”) to prosecute Saddam Hussein and other former
Iraqi leaders for war crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide, and the crime of aggression.1
This memorandum will examine the scope of the IHT’s power to appoint defense counsel in
compliance with the international right to counsel. More specifically, this memorandum
examines the compatibility of the provisions safeguarding the right to counsel in the IHT Statute
and the IHT Rules of Procedure and Evidence with the prevailing international standards. In
doing so, this memorandum analyzes (1) when and in what manner the Tribunal can assign
counsel; (2) the procedure by which to assign counsel; (3) the minimum level of proficiency
required for defense counsel; (4) the right of an indigent defendant to choose court-appointed
counsel; (5) the implications of assigning counsel against the accused’s wishes, especially if the
accused has the ability to retain his own counsel; and (6) the need for a standby counsel to
properly ensure the defendant’ right to an effective assistance of counsel.

*

See E-mail from Eric H. Blinderman, Chief Legal Counsel, Regime Crimes Liaison Office, to Michael Scharf,
Professor and Director, Frederick K. Cox International Law Center, Case Western Reserve University School of
Law, IHT Research: Question 1 (on file with author). The focus of this paper derives from the E-mail, which states:
The current defense attorneys for Saddam Hussein have repeatedly threatened to boycott the IHT
if the court does not accede to their every demand. On at least one occasion, the defense attorneys
actually did walk out of the Court. In the event that the privately retained defense attorneys do
boycott the trial, what standards must the court follow when appointing public defenders so that it
does not violate international law? In other words, what is the level of proficiency that the Court
should demand of public defenders? How much time should the Court grant to the new lawyers so
that they may prepare adequately for trial? What steps should the Court take so that the
defendant’s right to a fair trial is not prejudiced?

1

Law of the Iraqi High Criminal Court, Preamble (2005) [hereinafter IHT Statute], available online at
http://www.law.case.edu/saddamtrial (Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 15).
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B. SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS
1. The international community has determined that the right to a fair trial is a
fundamental human right and that the right to counsel for the accused is
instrumental in ensuring a fair trial.
Traditionally, a defense counsel in a common-law adversarial system balances aggressive
state prosecutorial action to ensure a fair trial. The customary international law right to counsel
evolved from (1) common practices of states in the treatment and protection of prisoners of war;
(2) recognition of the need and the establishment of procedural safeguards during the Nuremberg
and Tokyo war crimes trials; (3) extension of constitutional and common law rights and
traditions into international law; and (4) widespread participation by states in the preparation,
adoption, and acceptance of international agreements recognizing basic human rights principles
as well as in providing general support for United Nations’ resolutions that apply international
human rights principles as international law.
Likewise, a number of international conventions also established the right to a fair trial
and a corresponding right to counsel as basic human rights. For example, Article 10 of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights envisions a right to fair trial and guarantees that
“[e]veryone is entitled in full equality to a fair and public hearing by an independent and
impartial tribunal.”2 Moreover, Article 6 of the European Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights confers the right to counsel “when the interests of justice so require.”3 In addition,
the right to counsel is protected as an essential right that safeguards the right to fair trial in the

2

See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A.Res. 217A, U.N.GAOR, 3d Sess., Supp. No. 1, art. 10, U.N.Doc.
A/810 (1948) [hereinafter UDHR] (Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 25).
3

See Convention on the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, art. 6(3)(c), 213
U.N.T.S. 221 (entered into force Sept. 3, 1953) [hereinafter European Convention] (Reproduced in accompanying
notebook at Tab 3).

2

American Convention of Human Rights and the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights.4
Lastly, Article 14(d) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights guarantees that a
person has a right “to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing;
to be informed…of this right; and to have legal assistance assigned to him….”5
2. The parameters of the right to counsel in international criminal proceedings are
beginning to be developed and refined through the jurisprudence and the
experience of the international ad hoc tribunals, hybrid courts, and the national
common law courts.
Representing an amalgamation of both common law and civil law principles, the
international ad hoc tribunals established to prosecute atrocity crimes in the former Yugoslavia
and Rwanda, as well as the International Criminal Court (ICC), and the Special Court for Sierra
Leone have applied international standards of justice and norms of fairness in their proceedings.
In order to guarantee fairness in the proceedings that are predominantly adversarial, the statutes
of the tribunals, the rules of procedure and evidence, and case law further articulate the right to
counsel. Furthermore, the jurisprudence from these tribunals has contributed to the unraveling of
the scope of the international law right to counsel.
The right to counsel as articulated in the case law of the ICTY, ICTR, and SCSL
established the following baseline parameters: (1) the right to counsel and the right to be
informed of this right attaches upon entering the jurisdiction of the court; (2) permit defendants
to choose their counsel within limits; (3) provide adequate access to counsel but not equal
recourses; and (4) permit a qualified right to self-representation. The jurisprudence of the ICTY,
ICTR, and SCSL interpreting the respective statutes and rules of procedure and evidence
4

See African (Banjul) Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Jun. 27, 1981, 21 I.L.M. 58 (1982) (entered into
force Oct. 21, 1986) [hereinafter African Charter] (Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 1); see also
American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, art. 8, para. 2(e), 1144 U.N.T.S. 144, 147 (entered into
force Jul. 18, 1978) [hereinafter American Convention] (Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 2).
5

See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, art. 14(d), 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into
force Mar. 23, 1976) [hereinafter ICCPR] (Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 8).
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established that although the accused has the right to select counsel, this right is limited when the
tribunal must compensate counsel.
3. In the event that the privately retained defense attorneys do boycott the trial or
walk out of the Court, the IHT may assign public defenders in their place in the
interests of justice.
Two related arguments bolster the competency of IHT to assign public defenders in place
of privately retained attorneys when they threaten to boycott the proceedings or walk out in
contempt of the Court. First, a defendant’s right to defend himself through legal assistance of his
own choosing is limited by the necessity to protect the overarching fairness, integrity, object, and
purpose of the Tribunal. When a defense-team-instigated boycott of the proceedings or
misconduct rises to disrupting and undermining the integrity of the Tribunal, the right to legal
assistance of one’s own choosing must yield to the overarching requirement of a fair trial.
Second, a privately retained defense counsel’s professional misconduct and contempt of the
Court give rise to an implied waiver of the defendant’s right to choose his own lawyer.
4. The IHT must establish a transparent procedure of assigning defense counsel to
further guarantee the rights of the accused and provide adequate notice.
The IHT should use pre-existing directives on assignment of counsel from the ICTY,
ICTR, and SCSL as models when developing its own regulatory procedure to assign defense
counsel. The IHT’s directive on assignment of defense counsel could include (1) a procedure for
assigning counsel that clearly lays out the steps; (2) provisions that provide adequate notice to
the defendants; (3) allocation of costs and expenses; (4) the scope of legal representation; and (5)
a level of competence expected of defense counsel.
5. The IHT must require a high standard of qualifications from its defense attorneys.
A high standard of defense counsel qualifications ensure that defendants are represented
by competent attorneys who satisfy minimum international human rights standards. The IHT

4

should model its standard of qualifications on the pre-existing standards from the ICC, ICTY,
ICTR, and SCSL. The IHT must require prospective defense counsel to (1) be fluent in at least
one of the working languages of Court; (2) be admitted to practice law in a State; (3) maintain an
unblemished professional and criminal records; and (4) have 7-10 years of relevant practice
experience in criminal law, international law, international humanitarian law, or international
human rights law.
6. In addition to requiring a high standard of qualification for defense counsels, the
IHT must institute additional measures to ensure that defendants receive an
effective assistance of counsel.
Although a high standard for attorney qualifications is needed to meet minimum
international human rights standards, a qualified counsel does not necessarily mean an effective
counsel. A newly assigned counsel, even if he is highly qualified, will have some difficulty
assisting his new client if he has not been present in the courtroom or does not know the defense
strategy. In the IHT context, this scenario came into fruition when Judge Rahman promptly
replaced the Saddam Hussein’s defense team on January 29, 2006 with a new team of six courtappointed lawyers, who sat silently as the trial proceeded.
The reluctance of these court-appointed lawyers in cross examining the witnesses raises
serious questions about fairness. In order to alleviate effective assistance concerns, the IHT
should employ highly qualified standby counsel to represent defendants who need court assigned
counsel. In addition to the benefit of not introducing delay, employment of standby counsel
reinforces IHT’s conviction to take necessary steps to ensure the right to fair trial.
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The IHT’s need to assign public defenders in place of privately retained defense attorneys
can arise under a number of circumstances: the assassination of defense counsel; the withdrawal

5

of defense counsel for personal and professional reasons; the ability of the accused to retain
defense counsel; and possible boycott by defense attorneys because of IHT’s refusal to meet their
every demand. Despite their ethical duties, the defense attorneys in the Saddam Hussein trial
have either threatened to boycott the trial proceedings or actually walked out of the Court
because of many disagreements over security and other concerns.6 Likewise, a recent increase in
sectarian violence in Iraq, coupled with inadequate security, makes future kidnapping and
assassination of defense counsel an alarming possibility.
On October 20, 2005, Saadoun Sughaiyer al-Janabi, an attorney representing one of
Saddam Hussein’s co-defendants was kidnapped from his office in Baghdad.7 Mr. Janabi’s body,
with two bullet wounds to the head, was found near his Baghdad office by the Iraqi authorities
shortly after he was reportedly kidnapped by armed men who identified themselves as interior
ministry employees.8 Mr. Janabi was defending the former head of Saddam Hussein’s
Revolutionary Court, Awad Hamed al-Bandar, against charges accusing the latter of ordering the
massacre of 143 Shia residents in the town of Dujail in 1982.9 At the three-hour hearing which
opened the trial, Mr. Janabi was one of several defense lawyers who mounted vociferous
objections to the opening statements by Jaafar al-Musawi, the chief prosecutor.10

6

See John F. Burns, Hussein’s Lawyers Refuse to Work with Iraqi Court, N. Y. TIMES, Oct. 27, 2005, at A14
(Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 60); see also Ewen MacAskill, Saddam’s Legal Team Stops Work
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In a separate incident, gunmen ambushed two other defense lawyers in the Saddam
Hussein trial—Adel Muhammad al-Zubaidi and Thamir Mahmoud al-Khuzaie—killing the
former and seriously wounding the latter.11 Both lawyers were representing Barzan Ibrahim alTikriti, Mr. Hussein’s half brother and former head of Iraq’s intelligence service, and Taha
Yassin Ramadan, a former vice president under Mr. Hussein.12 Despite vowing to boycott the
trial proceedings over security concerns, Saddam Hussein’s defense team has repeatedly rejected
offers by Iraqi officials and the U.S. military to provide security arrangements on the basis that it
would compromise their independence.13 Although recognizing the defense team’s need for
independence from the Iraqi government, many legal experts have criticized the Hussein defense
team’s strategy to boycott the trials as an attempt to discredit the proceedings, force delays, and
bring about venue change.14
Furthermore, unlike the judges and the prosecutors in Saddam Hussein’s trial, whose
identities have been kept secret to prevent insurgent reprisals against them, the names of the
defense lawyers have not been withheld and they openly appear on camera during trial.15 In
addition to concerns that the slayings of the defense lawyers would damage the credibility of
Iraq’s judicial system, Richard Dicker, a lawyer with Human Rights Watch, emphasized that the
slayings would have a chilling effect on the willingness of competent lawyers to vigorously
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defend the accused.16 While this possible chilling effect may raise additional concerns over the
fairness of the proceedings, the most immediate repercussion of these assassinations is Saddam
Hussein’s defense team’s use of what they perceive to be inadequate security as a bargaining
chip, a delay tactic, and a reason to boycott the proceedings.
In response to Mr. Janabi’s assassination, the Iraqi Bar Association called for a one-day
strike and urged lawyers to stop working with the IHT until the murder is properly investigated
and solved.17 Citing worries about their personal safety and their inability to mount a proper
defense for their clients in the current climate of insecurity, the defense lawyers for Saddam
Hussein and his co-defendants had threatened to boycott the proceedings.18 As a sign of future
challenges to come, the defense team refused to attend a special court hearing to take testimony
from a dying former intelligence officer at a private hospital because their security demands were
not met.19 In such a situation, the IHT will be forced into a difficult position to either safeguard
the defendant’s right to counsel by assigning a new defense counsel or giving in to the defense
team’s every demand.
In addition to boycotting the trial proceedings, the Saddam Hussein’s defense team has
walked out of the Court in protest, and in some instances, has had its members thrown out of the
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courtroom.20 The courtroom showdown that erupted on January 29, 2006 ousting a co-defendant
and a defense attorney from the courtroom provoked a walkout by the rest of the defense team
and resulted in subsequent appointment of defense counsel by the new chief judge.21 The
defense team walked out in protest after Judge Raouf Rasheed Abdel Rahman imposed order in
the courtroom by removing Barzan Ibrahim al-Tikriti and a defense attorney for their refusal to
abide by his commands.22 Despite objections by Mr. Hussein and his co-defendants, Judge
Rahman promptly replaced the defense team with a new team of six court-appointed lawyers,
who sat silently as the trial proceeded.23
III. LEGAL DISCUSSION
Before I discuss the particulars of evidence, some general considerations which may
affect the credit of this trial in the eyes of the world should be candidly faced. There is a
dramatic disparity between the circumstances of the accusers and the accused that might
discredit our work if we should falter in even minor matters, in being fair and
temperate….We must never forget that the record on which we judge these defendants is
the record on which history will judge us tomorrow. To pass these defendants a poisoned
chalice is to put it to our lips as well. We must summon such detachment and intellectual
integrity to our task that this Trial will commend itself to posterity as fulfilling humanity's
aspiration to do justice.
24
Justice Robert H. Jackson (November 20, 1945)

A. INTERNATIONAL RIGHT TO COUNSEL
From the Nuremberg Tribunals to the Saddam Hussein Trial, there exists an inherent
tension between retribution and fairness. Although the establishment of international tribunals to
20
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prosecute war criminals serve to record history, educate the world, and function as a future
deterrent, these proceedings are often accused of resembling ‘show trials’ that further the victors’
interests.25 In order to overcome the appearance of victor’s justice, it is important to not only
prosecute the accused, but to ensure that the truth-seeking function of the tribunal occurs within
the constraints of a fair trial.
Moreover, the international community, through customary international law and formal
treaties, has determined that the right to a fair trial is a basic human right.26 As such, when the
international community sets out to prosecute those responsible for atrocity crimes, international
law requires that the trials be fair. To ensure that the trials are fair, the international norms
require that the accused be represented by effective counsel. Thus, the right to counsel preserves
the legitimacy of the tribunal by safeguarding the defendant’s right to a fair trial.
However, the right to counsel guaranteed in various international treaties and national
constitutions, means more than the right to have a lawyer present in the courtroom. Interrelated
procedural protections further safeguard the substantive right to counsel. Some of the procedural
rules that provide substance to the international right to counsel may include: when the right
attaches; when the right is waived; the parameters of the defendant’s right to choose his counsel;
the limitations on the defendant’s right to self-representation; the qualifications of the defense
counsel; when and in what manner the Court may appoint counsel; and equality of arms. Despite
the importance of many of the issues presented above, this memorandum focuses on the scope of
the IHT’s authority to assign defense counsel in a way that does not violate international law.
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the ICC] (Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 51).
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1. Right to Counsel under Customary International Law
Customary international law results from a “general and consistent practice of states
followed by them from a sense of legal obligation.”27 The practice of states necessary to create
customary law must be general and consistent; both action and inaction may constitute state
practice, which includes “diplomatic acts and instructions as well as public measures and other
governmental acts and official statements of policy, whether they are unilateral or undertaken in
cooperation with other states….”28 A second requirement for a practice of states to become
customary international law is that the states follow the general and consistent practice from a
sense of legal obligation—opinio juris sive necessitatis.29
The customary international law right to counsel evolved from (1) the common practices
of states in the treatment and protection of prisoners of war; (2) the recognition of the need and
establishment of procedural rules of law during the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials to protect the
defendant’s right to a fair trial; (3) extension of constitutional and common law rights and
traditions into international law; and (4) the virtually universal participation of states in the
preparation, adoption, and acceptance of basic human rights principles enshrined in various
international and regional instruments. More importantly, the analysis of the customary
international law right to counsel provides guidance of minimum standards of representation
required in war crimes trials.
First, the customary international law basis for requiring effective legal representation at
war crimes trials originated with the efforts to improve treatment and protection of prisoners of
27

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 102(2) (1987) [hereinafter
Restatement (Third)] (Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 17).
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war.30 The right of prisoners of war to receive defense representation was initially codified in
the 1929 Geneva Convention.31 Article 61 provides that “[n]o prisoner of war may be sentenced
without having had an opportunity to defend himself.”32 Furthermore, Article 62 guarantees,
“[t]he prisoner of war shall have the right to be assisted by a qualified advocate of his own
choice....”33 The Third Geneva Convention of 1949 (Geneva III) further supplemented the 1929
Geneva Convention by expanding the legal rights of prisoners of war before judicial and tribunal
hearings.34 Article 99 of Geneva III ensures that “[n]o prisoner of war may be convicted without
having had an opportunity to present his defense and the assistance of a qualified advocate or
counsel.”35
The International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg (IMT) and the International Military
Tribunal for the Far East at Tokyo (IMTFE) also promulgated procedural rules guaranteeing the
right to counsel for the indicted German and Japanese war criminals.36 Echoing the fairness
concerns of the lead American Prosecutor, Supreme Court Justice Robert Jackson, Article 16 of
the Nuremberg Charter provides, “[a] Defendant shall have the right to conduct his own defense

30

Joshua E. Kastenberg, The Right to Assistance of Counsel in Military and War Crimes Tribunals: An International
and Domestic Law Analysis, 14 IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 175, 180-185 (2003) [hereinafter Kastenberg]
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before the Tribunal or to have the assistance of Counsel.”37 In establishing the right to counsel
as a subset of the right to a fair trial, the Nuremberg and Tokyo war crimes tribunals set a
“standard from which later international trials could not deviate.”38
In the United States, the right to “Assistance of Counsel” is protected under the Sixth
Amendment to the Constitution.39 In addition, the United States’ standing on the international
stage has allowed its constitutional and common law traditions and norms to have a tremendous
impact on the development of international law. Many other nations around the world have also
incorporated the right to counsel, directly or through reference, in their respective national
constitutions and laws.40 Lastly, there is a widespread participation by states in the preparation,
adoption, and acceptance of international agreements recognizing basic human rights principles
as well as in providing general support for United Nations resolutions that apply international
human rights principles as international law.41
2. Right to Counsel under International and Regional Treaties
In addition to its status as customary international law, the international right to counsel
is also created by various international and regional agreements that are intended for adherence

37
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by states generally and are in fact widely accepted.42 The accused right to counsel and its parent
right, the right to a fair trial, are protected under two international agreements: the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights (“UDHR”) and the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights (“ICCPR”).43 Additionally, the right to counsel is recognized as a subset of the right to
fair trial under regional agreements such as the European Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, the American Convention of Human Rights, and the
African Charter on Human and People’s Rights.44
Two provisions contained in the UDHR safeguard procedural fairness for all accused
persons subject to judicial proceedings. Article 10 of the UDHR guarantees that “[e]veryone is
entitled in full equality to a fair and public hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal, in
the determination of his rights and obligations and of any criminal charge against him.”45
Likewise, Article 11 calls for a presumption of innocence, protection from wrongful
imprisonment, and prohibition of unjust punishment.46 However, since the UDHR was adopted
as a statement of principles, the question of whether the UDHR is legally binding under
international law remains somewhat controversial.
It is possible to argue that even if the UDHR itself is not legally binding, at least some of
the principles contained in it have attained the status of customary international law because (1)
the UDHR is an authoritative interpretation of the human rights provisions in the U.N. Charter,

42
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and (2) some principles were already legally binding through other international agreements. In
Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit recognized
that at least some of the UDHR provisions have become binding as customary international law
through widespread state practice.47
The civil and political rights protected in the UDHR are codified into binding treaty law
through the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). However, unlike the
UDHR, the ICCPR requires member states to refrain from actions that would violate the civil
and political rights of individuals—freedoms and immunities which a member state can respect
by leaving the individual alone.48 Since Iraq is party to the ICCPR,49 it is obligated under the
treaty to “respect and ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction”
the right to counsel.50 Under Article 14(d) of the ICCPR, every person has the right to
[d]efend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing; to be
informed, if he does not have legal assistance, of this right; and to have legal
assistance assigned to him, in any case where the interests of justice so require,
and without payment by him in any such case if he does not have sufficient means
to pay for it.51
Although the UDHR and ICCPR did not provide the exact scope of the right to counsel, they
establish an international norm that assistance by defense counsel balances the prosecutorial
aggressiveness in an adversarial system to ensure a fair trial.
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Regional human rights instruments also echo the right to counsel protected in the UDHR
and the ICCPR in similar terms. Under Article 6, paragraph 3(c) of the European Convention on
Human Rights, everyone charged with a criminal offense has the right “to defend himself in
person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay
for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require….”52 Likewise,
Article 8, paragraph 2(e) of the American Convention of Human Rights guarantees every person
accused of a criminal offense “[t]he inalienable right to be assisted by counsel provided by the
State, paid or not as the domestic law provides, if the accused does not defend himself personally
or engage his own counsel within the time period established by law….”53 Lastly, Article 7,
paragraph 1(c) of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights provides “the right to
defense, including the right to be defended by counsel of his choice….”54
B. INTERPRETATIONS OF THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL PROVISIONS BY THE HUMAN RIGHTS
COMMITTEE AND THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS
Both the Human Rights Committee and the European Court of Human Rights have
interpreted the parameters of the right to counsel protected in Article 14(d) of ICCPR, and
Article 6, paragraph 3(c) of the European Convention on Human Rights, respectively. More
specifically, the decisions focused on the right of the accused to choose his own court appointed
counsel. Although both judicial bodies placed limitations on the indigent defendant’s right to
choose court appointed counsel, both the Human Rights Committee and the European Court of
Human Rights emphasized the importance of the accused’s wishes and required the courts to
establish minimum standards in ensuring effective assistance of counsel. However, these
52
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decisions did not address the scope of the tribunal’s authority to assign counsel when the accused
has the ability to obtain a counsel of his own choosing.
1. Interpretation of Article 14(d) of the ICCPR by the Human Rights Committee
The United Nations Human Rights Committee (“Committee”) scrutinized Article 14(d)
of the ICCPR in a series of decisions on Jamaica—Wright v. Jamaica,55 Kelly v. Jamaica,56
Berry v. Jamaica,57 and Collins v. Jamaica.58 Although violations of Article 14(d) rights based
on ineffective assistance of counsel were established, the Committee did not recognize the right
of an indigent defendant to choose his own court appointed counsel.
In Wright v. Jamaica, the defendant and co-defendant were convicted on retrial and
sentenced to death for murder.59 After exhausting the domestic remedies, the defendants
petitioned the Human Rights Committee and claimed that their rights under Article 14(d) of
ICCPR were violated when (1) the defendant was not represented by counsel at the preliminary
hearing and (2) the court appointed counsel representing the co-defendant did not take a
statement from him, did not meet him until the beginning of the trial, and conceded that he could
not support the appeal.60 The Committee, in finding Article 14(d) violations, held that while
55
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Article 14(d) of ICCPR “does not entitle the accused to choose counsel provided to him free of
charge, the Court should ensure that the conduct of the case by the lawyer is not incompatible
with the interests of justice.”61
Likewise, in Kelly v. Jamaica, the Committee held that while Article 14(d) of ICCPR
“does not entitle the accused to choose counsel provided to him free of charge, measures must be
taken to ensure that counsel, once assigned, provides effective representation in the interests of
justice.”62 In Kelly, the defendant contested his conviction for murder on grounds that the court
appointed counsel’s argument before the appeals court that the appeal has no merit, without
informing the defendant, violated his right under Article 14(d) because it effectively left the
defendant without legal representation.63 In finding a violation of Article 14(d), the Committee
held that, at a minimum, the court appointed counsel has a duty to “consult with and inform the
accused if he intends to withdraw an appeal or to argue before the appeal court that the appeal
has no merit.”64
However, a violation of Article 14(d) due to ineffective assistance of counsel arises only
when court appointed counsel for indigent defendants violates the court rules or professional
code of ethics. In Berry v. Jamaica, the Committee concluded that there was no violation of
Article 14(d) because the failure of the defendant’s counsel to bring up certain issues before the
court, even though it prejudiced the outcome of the trial, could not be attributed to the state party
since the lawyer was privately retained.65 Furthermore, in determining when the alleged

61

Id. at ¶ 10.5.

62

Kelly v. Jamaica, supra note 56, at ¶ 5.10.

63

Id. at ¶ 3.5.

64

Id. at ¶ 5.10.

65

Berry v. Jamaica, supra note 57, at ¶ 11.3
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professional misconduct rises to ineffective assistance of counsel that constitutes a violation of
Article 14(d), the Human Rights Committee, in Collins v. Jamaica, held that “in the absence of
clear evidence of professional negligence on the part of counsel, it is not for the Committee to
question the latter’s professional judgment.”66
2. Interpretation of Article 6, para. 3(c) of the European Convention on Human
Rights by the European Court of Human Rights
In Pakelli v. Germany, the European Court of Human Rights held that Article 6,
paragraph 3(c) of the European Convention of Human Rights entitles everyone charged with a
criminal offense to be defended by counsel of his own choosing.67 Furthermore, subject only to
the restrictions based on the qualifications of the defense counsel under paragraphs 4 and 5 of
Rule 36,68 Rule 91 of the Court Rules allows free legal assistance for indigent defendants.69 The
contours of the right of the accused to choose his court appointed counsel under Article 6,
paragraph 3(c) of the European Convention on Human Rights were further elucidated in the case
of Croissant v. Germany.70
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In Croissant, the defendant was convicted and subsequently disbarred for his activities as
a lawyer for various members of the Red Army Faction (RAF), a criminal organization.71
During the proceedings at the Stuttgart Regional Court, the defendant was initially represented
by two lawyers of his own choosing.72 However, the dispute in question arose when the
President of the Stuttgart Regional Court assigned a third counsel over the defendant’s objections
as well as his preference for a different counsel.73 The defendant challenged his conviction on
the grounds that the Stuttgart Regional Court’s appointment of a third defense counsel against his
objections violated his rights under Article 6, paragraph 3(c) of the European Convention on
Human Rights.74
The European Court of Human Rights, in denying the defendant’s claim, further
illuminated its previous holding in Pakelli v. Germany and held:
It is true that Article 6 para. 3(c) (art. 6-3-c) entitles ‘everyone charged with a
criminal offence’ to be defended by counsel of his own choosing….Nevertheless,
and notwithstanding the importance of a relationship of confidence between
lawyer and client, this right cannot be considered to be absolute. It is necessarily
subject to certain limitations where free legal aid is concerned and also where, as
in the present case, it is for the courts to decide whether the interests of justice
require that the accused be defended by counsel appointed by them. When
appointing defense counsel the national courts must certainly have regard to the
defendant’s wishes; indeed, German law contemplates such as course….However,
they can override those wishes when there are relevant and sufficient grounds for
holding that this is necessary in the interests of justice.75
Although the European Court of Human Rights placed limitations on the defendant’s right to
choose court appointed counsel when the legal aid is free, the Court recognizes that the wishes of
71
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the accused must be considered if the interests of justice are to be served. Accordingly, the
“appointment [of counsel] that runs counter to [the defendant’s] wishes will be incompatible
with the notion of fair trial under Article 6 para. 1 (art. 6-1) if, even taking into account a proper
margin of appreciation, it lacks relevant and sufficient justification.”76
C. PRECEDENT FROM INTERNATIONAL AD HOC TRIBUNALS
At the end of the Second World War, the accused Nazi and Japanese leaders were
prosecuted for their war crimes at the International Military Tribunals established at Nuremberg
and Tokyo, respectively. Fifty years later, the U.N. Security Council established ad hoc tribunals
under its Chapter VII powers to try those accused of war crimes, crimes against humanity, and
genocide in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda. Likewise, the establishment of the hybrid
Special Court for Sierra Leone as well as the International Criminal Court signified a further
commitment by the international community to bring the perpetrators of atrocity crimes to justice.
Representing an amalgamation of both common law and civil law principles, the ad hoc
tribunals use established international standards of justice and norms of fairness in their
proceedings; in return, jurisprudence from these tribunals contribute to the development of
international law. In order to guarantee fairness in the proceedings that are predominantly
adversarial, the statutes of the tribunals, the rules of procedure and evidence, and case law further
articulate the right to counsel. The baseline parameters of the right to counsel arising from the
international ad hoc tribunals include: (1) the right to counsel and the right to be informed of this
right attaches upon entering the jurisdiction of the court; (2) the defendants’ right to choose their
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counsel within limits; (3) adequate access to counsel but not equal resources; and (4) a qualified
right to self-representation.77
1. Assignment of Counsel in the Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals
A defendant’s right to counsel is protected under Article 16 of the Nuremberg Charter,
which provides: “[a] Defendant shall have the right to conduct his own defense before the
Tribunal or to have the assistance of Counsel.”78 In order to protect the legitimacy of the tribunal
from future challenges grounded in the denial of a fair trial, “[e]very defendant…had the right
under the law to be represented by counsel of his own selection providing such counsel was
qualified to conduct cases before the German courts or was specifically authorized by the
Tribunal.”79 In practice, “no German lawyer [was] excluded if he was requested as counsel for a
defendant…[and] most of the German counsel chosen are themselves subject to arrest or trial in
German courts under German law for membership in the Nazi Party or the criminal SS.”80
This selection criteria and procedural practice from the Nuremberg Tribunal would form
the foundation for the future procedural rules regarding the registrar’s role in the assignment of
legal assistance as well as the appointment and qualifications of defense counsel that are found in
the ICC and ad hoc tribunals. Likewise, the defendants in the Tokyo Tribunal were afforded
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defense counsel, albeit with differences in the selection process of counsel where “[m]ost of the
Japanese defendants were provided military officers with legal billets (JAGS).”81
2. Statutory and Procedural Rules Relating to Assignment of Counsel and SelfRepresentation under the ICC, ICTY, ICTR, and SCSL
While the defendant’s right to counsel is protected by the statutes of the ICC, ICTY,
ICTR, and SCSL, the rules of evidence and procedure from the tribunals further define the scope
of the tribunals’ authority as well as the process by which to assign defense counsel. Despite
their similarities in process, differences exist between the tribunals with regard to the standards
used to determine the qualification of defense counsel.
a. International Criminal Court (ICC)
The functions and powers of the ICC trial chamber are restrained by its Statute and the
Rules of Procedure and Evidence. Article 64 of the Rome Statute of the ICC prescribing the
‘Functions and Powers of the Trial Chamber’ provides in paragraphs 1 and 2:
1. The functions and powers of the Trial Chamber set out in this article shall be
exercised in accordance with this Statute and the Rules of Procedure and
Evidence.
2. The Trial Chamber shall ensure that a trial is fair and expeditious and is
conducted with full respect for the rights of the accused and due regard for the
protection of victims and witnesses.82
Likewise, the accused’s right to counsel, guaranteed in Article 67, paragraph 1(d) of the ICC
Statute, entitles the accused to:
a public hearing, having regard to the provisions of this Statute, to a fair hearing
conducted impartially, and to the following minimum guarantees in full equality:
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…(d)…to conduct the defense in person or through legal assistance of the
accused’s choosing, to be informed, if the accused does not have legal assistance,
of this right and to have legal assistance assigned by the Court in any case where
the interests of justice so require, and without payment if the accused lacks
sufficient means to pay for it.83
The scope of the Court’s authority to assign defense counsel, the process of assigning
counsel and the qualifications of the counsel are set out in ICC’s Rules of Procedure and
Evidence. Rule 22, paragraph 1, detailing the qualifications of the defense counsel, prescribes:
[a] counsel for the defense shall have established competence in international or
criminal law and procedure, as well as the necessary relevant practice, whether as
judge, prosecutor, advocate or in other similar capacity, in criminal proceedings.
A counsel for the defense shall have an excellent knowledge of and be fluent in at
least one of the working languages of the Court. Counsel for the defense may be
assisted by persons, including professors of law, with relevant expertise.84
In addition to the Rule 20 responsibilities of the Registrar relating to the rights of the defense,85
Rule 21, paragraph 1 requires the Registrar to establish a code of regulations detailing the criteria
and procedures for assignment of legal assistance.86 Lastly, under Rule 21, paragraph 2, the
Registrar “shall create and maintain a list of counsel who meet the criteria…[and the accused]
shall freely choose his or her counsel from this list or other counsel who meets the required
criteria and is willing to be included in the list.”87
b. International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY)
The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) was established
on May 25, 1993 by the Security Council acting under its Chapter VII powers to “prosecute
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persons responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian law committed in the
territory of former Yugoslavia since 1991.”88 Similar to the ICC, the tribunal “shall ensure that a
trial is fair and expeditious and that proceedings are conducted in accordance with the rules of
procedure and evidence, with full respect for the rights of the accused and due regard for the
protection of the victims and witnesses.”89 Likewise, Article 21, paragraph 4(d) of the ICTY
statute echoes the language of the ICCPR in guaranteeing the defendant’s right to counsel:
to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing; to be
informed, if he does not have legal assistance, of this right; and to have legal
assistance assigned to him, in any case where the interests of justice so require,
and without payment by him in any such case if he does not have sufficient means
to pay for it.90
The Tribunal’s Rules of Procedure and Evidence as well as its regulatory Directive on
Assignment of Defense Counsel further refine when and in what manner the Tribunal can assign
defense counsel, the responsibilities of the Registrar, and the qualifications of the defense
counsel. Rule 44, paragraph A of the ICTY’s Rules of Procedure and Evidence sets out the
following requirements for the appointment and qualifications of counsel:
...a counsel shall be considered qualified to represent a suspect or accused if the
counsel satisfies the Registrar that he or she:
(i) is admitted to practice of law in a State, or is a university professor of law;
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(ii) has written and oral proficiency in one of the two working languages of the
Tribunal….91
Moreover, sub-paragraphs iii-vii require a close scrutiny of the prospective counsel’s past ethical
conduct.92 Unlike the ICC, the Tribunal’s regulatory Directive on Assignment of Defense
Counsel further sets out the standards required for determining the qualification of counsel.93
c. International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR)
The ICTR Statute and the Rules of Procedure and Evidence were modeled after those
adopted by the ICTY. As in the ICTY and ICCPR, the right to counsel guaranteed in Article 20,
paragraph 4(d) of the ICTR Statute provides every defendant the right:
[t]o be tried in his or her presence, to defend himself in person or through legal
assistance of his own choosing; to be informed, if he does not have legal
assistance, of this right; and to have legal assistance assigned to him, in any case
where the interests of justice so require, and without payment by him in any such
case if he does not have sufficient means to pay for it.94
Although there is a great similarity in the procedural rules between the ICTR and ICTY, the
requirement of ten years of relevant experience is unique to the ICTR.95 Additionally, Rule 44 of
the ICTR Rules of Procedure and Evidence sets out the following requirements for the
appointment and qualifications of counsel:
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(A) Counsel engaged by a suspect or an accused shall file his power of attorney
with the Registrar at the earliest opportunity. Subject to verification by the
Registrar, a counsel shall be considered qualified to represent a suspect or accused,
provided that he is admitted to the practice of law in a State, or is a University
professor of law.
(B) In the performance of their duties counsel shall be subject to the relevant
provisions of the Statute, the Rules, the Rules of Detention and any other rules or
regulations adopted by the Tribunal, the Host County Agreement, the Code of
Conduct and the codes of practice and ethics governing their profession and, if
applicable, the Directive on the Assignment of Defense Counsel.96
Rule 45 of the ICTR Rules of Procedure and Evidence prescribes the authority to assign
counsel to the Registrar. Rule 45, paragraph (A) requires the Registrar to keep a list of counsel
“who speak one or both of the working languages of the Tribunal, meet the requirements of Rule
44, [and] have at least 10 years’ relevant experience….”97 Furthermore, Rule 45, paragraph (C)
divides the procedure for assigning counsel to an indigent defendant into three parts. First, a
request for court-appointed counsel must be made to the Registrar.98 Second, the Registrar must
make inquiries into the financial means of the accused to determine whether the criteria for
indigence are met.99 Lastly, if the Registrar “decides that the criteria are met, he shall assign
counsel from the list; if he decides to the contrary, he shall inform the…accused that the request
is refused.”100
d. Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL)
Unlike the ICTY and ICTR, the Special Court for Sierra Leone is a hybrid court; the
SCSL was established by an agreement reached between the government of Sierra Leone and the
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United Nations.101 In contrast to the ICTY and ICTR, “which try international crimes with
international lawyers in cities distant from the scene of the crime, the SCSL combines
international with national law, relies on local and international lawyers, and holds court in the
country where the crimes occurred.”102
Article 17, paragraph 4(d) of the SCSL Statute mirrors the ICCPR language and
guarantees every defendant the right:
[t]o be tried in his or her presence, and to defend himself or herself in person or
through legal assistance of his or her own choosing; to be informed, if he or she
does not have legal assistance, of this right; and to have legal assistance assigned
to him or her, in any case where the interests of justice so require, and without
payment by him or her in any such case if he or she does not have sufficient
means to pay for it.103
The Court’s authority to assign defense counsel is further clarified in its Rules of Procedure and
Evidence, promulgated pursuant to the requirements of Article 14 of the SCSL Statute.104
Since the ICTR’s Rules of Procedure and Evidence are applicable mutatis mutandis to the
conduct of the legal proceedings before the SCSL, Rule 44 sets out the appointment and
qualifications for counsel while Rule 45 envisions the establishment of Defense Office headed
by the Special Court Principle Defender for the purpose of ensuring the rights of suspects and
accused. Rule 44, paragraph A, requires counsel engaged by a suspect or an accused to “file his
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power of attorney with the Registrar at the earliest opportunity…, admitted to practice law in a
State and practices criminal law for a minimum of five years.”105
To facilitate assignment of counsel, Rule 45, paragraph C, requires the Principle
Defender to “maintain a list of highly qualified criminal defense counsel…[who] speak fluent
English, [are] admitted to practice law in any State; have at least 7 years’ relevant experience,
and have indicated their willingness and full-time availability to be assigned by the
[SCSL]….”106 In addition, the Directive on the Assignment of Counsel further expands the
procedure for the assignment of counsel, qualifications for the defense counsel, scope of legal
representation, payment of counsel, and withdrawal and replacement of counsel.107
3. Assignment of Counsel under the ICTY and ICTR
The jurisprudence of the ICTY, ICTR, and SCSL, interpreting the respective statutes and
rules of procedure and evidence, has established that the accused has the right to choose counsel
or be appointed counsel if he or she is indigent. Although the accused has the right to select
counsel, this right is limited when the tribunal must compensate counsel. In assigning counsel,
the Registrar has a duty to verify that the perspective counsel meets the standards of competence
required by the tribunal. However, none of the case law from the tribunals dealt directly with the
assignment of counsel for a non-indigent defendant who can otherwise retain his own counsel.
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a. ICTY
A number of ICTY decisions shed light on the right to assigned counsel: Prosecutor v.
Delalic et al.,108 Prosecutor v. Mrksic et al.,109 and Prosecutor v. Sljivancanin.110 In recognizing
that indigent defendants do not have an absolute right to choose their own counsel, the ICTY
Trial Chamber held in Delalic:
The [ICTY] Statute does not specifically state that the right to assigned counsel is
also a right to assigned counsel of the accused’s own choosing. Indeed, the right
to assigned counsel under the Directive is not totally without limit—counsel may
only be assigned if they are on a list maintained by the Registrar of the
International Tribunal….However, the practice of the Registry of the International
Tribunal has been to permit the accused to select any available counsel from this
list and to add counsel to the list if selected by an accused, provided that such
counsel meets the necessary criteria. The Trial Chamber supports this practice,
within practical limits.111
In Delalic, an indigent co-defendant requested an assignment of another lawyer for reasons other
than the competence or qualifications of a currently-assigned lawyer.112 The Trial Chamber
further held that “even though an accused has a right to counsel of his own choosing, the
overriding interest of the administration of justice means that he should not be permitted to seek
withdrawal of his assigned counsel without establishing good cause.”113
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In Prosecutor v. Sljivancanin, the Trial Chamber ruled that the right to select counsel is
limited when the Registrar must compensate counsel. In Sljivancanin, the defendant appealed
the Registrar’s refusal to assign him his preferred lawyers.114 In limiting an indigent accused’s
right to choose his assigned lawyer, the Trial Chamber held:
[w]hatever may be the scope of the right to counsel of one’s own choosing when a
defendant hires his own counsel, the right to publicly paid counsel of one’s own
choice is limited….[W]hile the Registrar should normally take a defendant’s
preferences into account, a defendant must accept any duly qualified counsel
appointed from the list maintained by the Registrar.115
The court further held that “[t]he party seeking assignment of counsel bears the burden of
convincing the Registrar that his preferred attorney meets the relevant criteria. The Registrar [in
turn] bears the responsibility to make clear the basis for his decisions.”116
b. ICTR
The parameters of an indigent defendant’s right to choose assigned counsel in the ICTR
context were adjudicated in Prosecutor v. Kambanda117 and Prosecutor v. Akayesu.118 In
Kambanda, the defendant was an ex-Rwandan Prime Minister, who was sentenced to life
imprisonment after pleading guilty to genocide and crimes against humanity.119 In appealing his
conviction, the defendant asserted a claim that the denial of his choice when a lawyer was
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assigned to him amounted to a violation of his right to a fair trial.120 The Appeals Chamber, after
referencing various international authorities, held that “the right to free legal assistance by
counsel does not confer the right to choose one’s counsel.”121
Likewise, in Akayesu, the defendant contended that the Registrar’s denial of his choice of
a court-appointed counsel resulted in the denial of his right to effective counsel even though he
had requested for a counsel who did not meet the standards of the Tribunal.122 In addition to
finding that Akayesu had been offered counsel and affirmatively refused it,123 the Appeals
Chamber held that an indigent defendant’s right to choose his court-appointed counsel must be
balanced against ensuring “proper use of the Tribunal’s resources.”124 Furthermore, the Appeals
Chamber, in reaffirming the Kambanda holding that the right to choose counsel is limited when
the tribunal compensates the attorney, held that “the right to free legal assistance of counsel does
not confer the right to counsel of ones own choosing.”125
4. Right to Self-Representation in Relation to Assignment of Counsel under the
ICTY, ICTR, and SCSL
Although the right to self-representation originated in common law, it is recognized as an
international right under Article 14(d)(3) of the ICCPR, Article 8(2) of the American Convention
on Human Rights, and Article 6(3)(c) of the European Convention on Human Rights.126
Moreover, the statutes of the ICTY, ICTR, and the SCSL provide that the accused has a right to
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“defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing.”127 However, the
ICTY, ICTR, and the SCSL vary in their treatment of the right to self-representation.
a. ICTY
The right to self-representation was hotly debated in the ICTY during the trial of
Slobodan Milosevic. In a decision criticized by many observers, the ICTY allowed Milosevic to
represent himself during his trial.128 Milosevic refused to enter a plea and declined to accept
court-appointed counsel during his initial appearance before the ICTY. In addition to appointing
amicus curiae counsel for Milosevic, the Trial Chamber ruled that Milosevic “has a right not to
have counsel [and that] it would not be practical to impose counsel on an accused who wishes to
represent himself.”129 Capitalizing on this, Milosevic turned the trial into his own political
platform, criticized the legitimacy of the court and the fairness of the proceedings, and mistreated
the prosecution, witnesses, and trial chamber judges in a way that would be never permitted by
ordinary defense counsel.130
Learning from this, the Trial Chamber reserved the limitations on the right to selfrepresentation in its subsequent decision on April 4, 2003.131 In that decision, the Trial chamber
rejected the Prosecution’s motion that defense counsel be imposed on Slobodan Milosevic to
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alleviate concerns that Milosevic would not be able to adequately represent himself. However,
the Trial Chamber ruled that although the “international and regional conventions (in similar
language) plainly articulates the right to [self representation]”,132 “the right to defend oneself in
person is not absolute…[and that] there may be circumstances …where it is in the interests of
justice to appoint counsel.”133
Likewise, finding that Milosevic’s health impeded the progress of the proceedings, the
Trial Chamber on September 22, 2004, held that it is competent to assign counsel to Milosevic
“in the interests of justice.”134 In asserting that the right to self-representation is a qualified right,
the Trial Chamber further ruled that “[t]he fundamental duty of the Trial Chamber is to ensure
that the trial is fair and expeditious.”135 On November 1, 2004, the Appeals Chamber affirmed
the Trial Chamber’s imposition of defense counsel but required the Trial Chamber to “craft a
working regime [assigning a standby counsel] that minimizes the practical impact of the formal
assignment of counsel, except to the extent required by the interests of justice.”136
b. ICTR
Unlike the ICTY, the ICTR in Prosecutor v. Barayagwiza imposed defense counsel on
the accused in the interest of justice.137 In Barayagwiza, the assigned defense counsel asked to
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withdraw from the case on the basis that the accused had instructed the counsel not to represent
him at the trial and refused to attend the trial.138 In rejecting the defendant’s motion, the Trial
Chamber held that “only in ‘most exceptional circumstances’ will Counsel assigned by the
Tribunal to represent an accused be permitted to withdraw from the case.”139 The Trial Chamber
found that the defendant’s contentions that he will not receive a fair and just trial did not meet
the ‘most exceptional circumstances’ test because the defendant was “actually boycotting the
United Nations Tribunal [in] an attempt to obstruct judicial proceedings.”140
The Trial Chamber also ruled that a court-assigned defense counsel is “under an
obligation to continue to represent an accused to the best of his ability, unless the Chamber
decides that they are permitted to withdraw.”141 Unlike defense counsel obtained by the accused,
whose representation may be terminated, the fact that the counsel in this case is assigned by the
court “does not only entail obligations towards the client, but also implies that he represents the
interest of the Tribunal to ensure that the Accused receives a fair trial.”142 Furthermore, in his
concurring opinion, Judge Gunawardana pointed out that Article 20(4) of the ICTR Statute
enabled the assignment of counsel “in any case where the interests of justice so require.”143
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c. SCSL
The SCSL addressed the issue of a defendant’s right to self-representation in Prosecutor
v. Norman.144 In Norman, the defendant, who was a former Minister of State Security, notified
the Trial Chamber of his intention to represent himself.145 After reviewing Article 17(4)(b)-(d)
of the SCSL Statute, Article 14 of the ICCPR, and Rule 26 bis of the SCSL Rules of Procedure
and Evidence, the Trial Chamber determined that the right to self-representation enshrined in its
Statute “is not absolute but rather, a qualified right.”146 In granting the defendant’s request with
qualifications, the Court cautioned that the right of a particular accused to represent himself must
be weighed against (1) the right to a fair and expeditious trial,147 (2) possible infringement of the
exercise of the right to self-representation on the institutional right of the court,148 and (3) the
timeliness of the application.149 The Trial Chamber assigned a standby counsel to assist Norman
in a later proceeding.150
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D. ASSIGNMENT OF COUNSEL IN THE UNITED STATES
1. Constitutional Rights to Retained and Appointed Counsel
In addition to the international precedence, domestic treatment of the right to counsel is
relevant as persuasive authority. Since the concept of the right to counsel is grounded in the
adversarial system, the United States’ jurisprudence on this topic is chosen as a prism to trace the
development of this right. In the United States, the Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution
guarantees that “in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right…to have the
assistance of counsel for his defense.”151 Although the right to representation by privately
retained counsel was apparent from the outset, constitutional right to appointed counsel was not
contemplated until 1932.
In Powell v. Alabama, the Supreme Court held that “in a capital case, where the
defendant is unable to employ counsel, and is incapable adequately of making his own defense…,
it is the duty of the court, whether requested or not, to assign counsel for him as a necessary
requisite of due process of law.”152 In Powell, eight black youths were sentenced to death for
raping two white girls in the vicinity of Scottsboro, Alabama.153 The defendants challenged on
the ground that they were denied effective assistance of counsel because counsel was not
appointed to them until moments before the trial began.154 The Powell Court’s rationale in
finding a constitutional right to appointed counsel arose out of the state’s obligation to provide a
fair hearing. Under this rationale, a state has an affirmative duty to appoint counsel for an
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indigent defendant because a lawyer’s assistance is needed to ensure a fair and accurate guiltdetermining process.155
Although the Powell ruling restricted the right to appointed counsel to the facts of that
case, later Supreme Court decisions broadened the scope of the right to appointed counsel. In
Johnson v. Zerbst, the Court per Justice Black held that the Sixth Amendment applies to all
criminal prosecutions and “withholds from the federal courts, the power and authority to deprive
an accused of his life or liberty unless he has or waives the assistance of counsel.”156 In Gideon
v. Wainwright, the Supreme Court held that the Sixth Amendment right to the appointment of
counsel for indigent defendants applies in state felony trials.157 In addition, the Gideon Court
maintained that in an “adversary[ial] system of criminal justice, any person hauled into court,
who is poor to hire a lawyer cannot be assured a fair trial unless counsel is provided for him.”158
2. Right to Effective Assistance of Counsel
A necessary corollary of a constitutional right to retained and appointed counsel is a
requirement that counsel provides effective assistance. The U.S. Supreme Court provided a
general framework for analysis of ineffective assistance of counsel claims through its decisions
in United States v. Chronic and Strickland v. Washington.159 In Strickland, the defendant
challenged his death sentence on the grounds that the strategic advice received from his attorney
during the guilt and penalty phases of his trial constituted ineffective assistance of counsel,
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thereby violating his Sixth Amendment right to counsel.160 The Supreme Court, in denying the
defendant’s challenge, held that “the right to counsel is the right to the effective assistance of
counsel.”161
Realizing the importance of effective assistance of counsel in an adversarial process, the
Court further held that “[t]he benchmark for judging any claim of ineffectiveness must be
whether counsel’s conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that
the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result.”162 In linking the standard for
effective assistance of counsel to proper functioning of the adversarial process, the Court placed
emphasis on meaningful adversarial testing and required a determination of actual
ineffectiveness under the facts of a particular case.163 Lastly, the Court set a high threshold to
establish ineffective assistance; in order to prevail on ineffective assistance claim, a defendant
must show (1) “…that counsel’s performance was deficient…, [and (2)] that the deficient
performance prejudiced the defense.”164
E. RIGHT TO COUNSEL—ASSIGNMENT OF COUNSEL AND RIGHT TO SELF-REPRESENTATION—
IN THE CONTEXT OF IHT
1. Statutory and Procedural Rules Relating to Assignment of Counsel and the Right
to Self-Representation under IHT
On December 10, 2003, the Iraqi Governing Council adopted the Statute of the Iraqi
Special Tribunal (the “2003 IST Statute”) and established the Iraqi Special Tribunal (“IST”) to
prosecute Saddam Hussein and other former Iraqi leaders for war crimes, crimes against
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humanity, genocide, and the crime of aggression.165 On March 8, 2004, the Iraqi Governing
Council promulgated the Law of Administration for the State of Iraq for the Transitional Period
(“TAL”) to serve as Iraq’s Interim Constitution.166 Article 48 of the TAL, in addition to
continuing and preserving the 2003 IST Statute in force and effect, declares that the 2003 IST
Statute “exclusively defines the [IST’s] jurisdiction and procedures, notwithstanding the
provisions of [the TAL].”167
On August 11, 2005, the Transitional National Assembly approved a revised Statute for
the IST, which abrogated in full the 2003 IST Statute while at the same time legitimizing the
IHT.168 Lastly, on October 9, 2005, the Iraqi Presidency Council, pursuant to approval by the
Transitional National Assembly, adopted the Statute of the Iraqi High Tribunal (“IHT Statute”)
and established the Iraqi High Tribunal.169 Although the IHT is established as a parallel court
within the structure of the national courts, it must uphold international law and use international
standards of justice and norms of fairness in its proceedings.
While Article 19 of the IHT Statute sets out the Guarantees of the Accused, Article 20
imposes statutory obligations on the IHT to ensure a fair and expeditious trial in accordance with
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the rights of the accused. Article 20, second paragraph of the IHT Statute structuring the Trial
Proceedings provides:
[t]he Criminal Court shall ensure that a trial is fair and expeditious and that
proceedings are conducted in accordance with this Statute and the Rules of
Procedure and Evidence annexed to this Law, with full respect for the rights of
the accused and due regard for the protection of victims, their relatives and the
witnesses.170
Likewise, the accused’s right to counsel is guaranteed by Article 19, paragraph 4(D), which
provides:
[i]n directing any charge against the accused pursuant to the present Law, the
accused shall be entitled to a just fair trial in accordance with the following
minimum guarantees:
…D. To be tried in his presence, and to use a lawyer of his own choosing, and to
be informed of his right [to] assistance of his own choosing; to be informed, if he
does not have legal assistance, of this right; and to have legal assistance and to
have the right to request such aid to appoint a lawyer without paying the fees, case
if he does not have sufficient means to pay for it; if he does not have the financial
ability to do so.171
Unlike similar provisions safeguarding the right to counsel in the statutes of international
criminal tribunals,172 as well as international and regional conventions on human rights,173 the
right to counsel under the IHT Statute, as amended, does not contain the right to selfrepresentation.174
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The Tribunal’s authority to assign defense counsel is further clarified in the IHT’s Rules
of Procedure and Evidence, promulgated pursuant to the provisions of Article 16 of the IHT
Statute.175 Appointment of defense counsel is governed by Rule 29 of the IHT’s Rules of
Procedure and Evidence.176 Rule 29, first paragraph requires the “Counsel engaged by an
accused [to] file his power of attorney with the concerned judge at the earliest opportunity. The
judge must verify qualification of the counsel in accordance with the Iraqi law of lawyers.”177
Furthermore, a defense counsel must adhere to the relevant provisions of the IHT Statute, IHT’s
Rules of Procedure and Evidence, any other rules or regulations adopted by the IHT, and lastly,
any codes of practice and ethics governing his profession.178
Likewise, Rule 30, first paragraph requires the Director of the Administration
Department to “establish a Defense Office for the purpose of ensuring the rights of the
accused.”179 The Defense Office functions to (1) provide “[l]egal assistance to any accused who
does not have sufficient means to pay for it, or as ordered by the [IHT]”;180 (2) make available
“[a]dequate facilities to enable the counsel to use in preparation of the Defense”;181 and (3)
“[a]ssign or appoint a counsel…to provide a legal assistance to a suspect or accused.”182
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Although the Director of the Defense Office is obligated to “select a highly qualified
criminal Defense counsel” to provide effective defense,183 the IHT’s Rules did not clearly
specify what ‘highly qualified’ entails. However, the selection criteria for Non-Iraqi
Advisors/Experts, whose role is restricted in the IHT,184 is “based upon their criminal law
experience in their respective countries,…extensive knowledge or experience in international
war crimes trials, [and exhibiting] high moral character and integrity.”185 Regardless, unlike the
comparable ICC, ICTY, ICTR, and SCSL procedural rules specifying the qualifications of a
defense counsel, the IHT’s Rules did not clearly spell out the qualifications needed for a defense
counsel.
2. Assignment of Defense Counsel under the IHT Statute and Rules
Article 19 of the IHT Statute provides the accused with the right to counsel as a minimum
guarantee to safeguard a just and fair trial.186 Furthermore, Article 20 of the IHT Statute imposes
an obligation on the Tribunal to “ensure that a trial is fair and expeditious….”187 A defendant’s
right to counsel itself is further defined by a bundle of rights: (1) the right to defend himself
through a counsel of his own choosing; (2) the right to be informed of this right; and (3) the right
to have counsel assigned to him whenever the interests of justice require it.188 However, these
subsidiary rights are not absolute; they must yield when it is necessary to ensure the overall
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integrity and fairness of the process as well as the achievement of the object and purpose of the
proceedings.
Thus, when assigning defense counsel in accordance with international law, the IHT must
balance the defendant’s right to counsel on the one hand and the need to safeguard the overall
integrity and fairness of the proceedings on the other. When privately retained defense attorneys
walk out in contempt of the Court or threaten to boycott the proceedings without sufficient cause,
the IHT may assign public defenders in place of privately retained counsel in the interests of
justice. However, the IHT must take a number of steps before wielding this power. First, the
IHT must establish a transparent procedure on the assignment of counsel, which provides
adequate notice to the defendant. Second, the IHT must make clear the level of proficiency
required for a defense counsel, and if possible, constitute a high standard of qualification. Lastly,
the IHT should consider instituting a standby counsel to avoid any unnecessary delay and
potential prejudice against the defendant during trial.
a. Competency of the IHT to Assign Counsel
Under Article 19 of the IHT Statute, a defendant has the right to be assigned counsel if he
or she is indigent.189 However, an indigent defendant’s right to assigned counsel is limited when
the Tribunal must compensate counsel; so long as the assigned counsel meets the standards of
competence required by the tribunal, the international precedence from the ICTY, ICTR, and
SCSL has consistently held that an indigent defendant’s right to assigned counsel does not
include the right to be represented by a counsel of defendant’s own choosing.190 In situations
where the court-assigned counsel for an indigent defendant threatens to boycott the proceedings,
walks out of the Court, or withdraws for safety reasons or any other exceptional circumstances,
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the IHT may take the defendant’s preferences into account in assigning counsel, but is not
obligated to assign the defendant’s choice of counsel.
The competency of the IHT to assign public defenders in place of privately retained
defense counsel for contempt of the court, on the other hand, calls for a more subtle approach.
The IHT, by assigning public defenders over the objections of defendants who can otherwise
retain defense counsel of their own choosing, leaves itself open to a possible challenge based on
the premise that its assignment of counsel violates a defendant’s right to retain a lawyer of his
own choosing. Furthermore, it can be argued that the IHT is required to allow the defendant to
retain another lawyer of his choice even when the previously retained counsel is removed for
misconduct. Two related arguments, however, lend support for the IHT’s authority to assign
public defenders in place of privately retained defense counsel.
First, the accused’s right to defend himself through legal assistance of his own choosing
is not an absolute right, but a qualified one. A defendant’s right to be represented by counsel of
his own choice is limited by the necessity to protect the overarching fairness, integrity, object,
and purpose of the Tribunal. In addition to delaying the trial proceedings, a defense-teaminstigated boycott of the proceedings and defense counsel misconduct in Court can have a real
and lasting impact in disrupting and undermining the integrity of the Tribunal. A disingenuous
defense tactic of this sort gives rise to a miscarriage of justice because the delay and disruption
of trial proceedings has its own ramifications on other ‘minimum guarantees’ safeguarding the
overall fairness of the trial proceedings. Moreover, jurisprudence from the national courts191 as
well as a line of cases from international tribunals restricting a defendant’s right to self
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representation192 suggest that the right to legal assistance of one’s own choosing must yield to
the overarching requirement of a fair trial.
Second, a privately retained defense counsel’s professional misconduct and contempt of
the Court give rise to an implied waiver of the defendant’s right to retain another lawyer of his
own choosing. Not only is the defense counsel bound by both IHT and international codes of
professional conduct, the defense counsel misconduct impairs the integrity of trial proceedings
and undermines the tribunal’s legitimacy. Moreover, the defense counsel’s misconduct
ultimately results in added delay because the replacement counsel will need adequate time to
prepare for defense. Even if the defense counsel is subjected to disciplinary proceedings, there is
no guarantee that the process will not repeat itself.
However, it is possible to argue that attributing an implied waiver on the defendant for
defense counsel’s misconduct is unfair, and that first transgression warrants only a warning and
not an assignment of a public defender. This line of argument, however, ignores the tendencies
of the defense team to delay the proceedings and discredit the tribunal. Furthermore, it
disregards the defendant’s role in developing the defense strategy. First, the Milosevic trial
taught us that (1) granting unbridled license to conduct defense could be detrimental to the
tribunal’s image and credibility;193 and (2) added delays could rob the tribunal of its historical
and educational components. Second, when a defendant participates in strategy development
and subsequently sanctions the defense counsel’s misconduct to delay the proceedings or
discredit the tribunal, it is as if the defendant himself has acted, thereby waiving his right to
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retain counsel of his own choosing. To do so otherwise would reward the defendant for using his
rights as a sword—in a deplorable manner no less—rather than their intended use as a shield.
Thus, assignment of counsel by the IHT for defense counsel misconduct becomes the
only mechanism to properly protect the defendant’s right to counsel while safeguarding the
integrity of the Tribunal. However, the IHT must implement a number of safeguards before
assigning public defenders in general. First, unlike other international criminal tribunals, the
IHT lacks a transparent procedure of assigning defense counsel. Second, the IHT must further
clarify minimum qualifications required for defense counsel. Lastly, the IHT must implement
mechanisms to ensure that a defendant is not only represented by qualified counsel but is in fact
receiving effective assistance of counsel.
b. Need for a Transparent Procedure in Assigning Defense Counsel
Rule 30 of the IHT’s Rules of Procedure and Evidence envisions the establishment of a
Defense Office where one of its many functions is to “[a]ssign or appoint a counsel…to provide
legal assistance to a suspect or accused.”194 Similarly, Rule 31, paragraph First allows “[a] judge
or a Criminal Court [to] impose legal proceedings against [the] counsel if…the counsel’s
conduct becomes offensive or abusive or demeans the dignity and decorum of the [IHT] or
obstructs the proceedings.”195 However, despite authorizing the assignment of counsel and the
ability to punish counsel for misconduct, the IHT is silent as to the exact procedure by which to
assign counsel. In order to further guarantee the rights of the accused and provide adequate
notice, the IHT must establish a transparent procedure in assigning defense counsel.
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The respective Registrar Offices of the ICTY, ICTR, and SCSL has prepared regulatory
directives for assigning defense counsel to indigent defendants.196 Although the context for
assigning defense counsel is different in this case, the IHT can nevertheless learn from these
existing models. First, the IHT’s directive on assignment of defense counsel must include a
procedure for assigning counsel.197 This procedure may include (1) the defendant’s
responsibilities; (2) if the defendant is indigent, the defendant’s financial situation and the
procedure to determine the defendant’s financial status; (3) the decision by the Director of the
Defense Office and notification of that decision to the defendant; and (4) assignment of counsel
in the interests of justice.198
Second, the IHT’s directive must adequately provide notice to the defendants when and
under what circumstances their privately retained defense attorneys may be removed and
replaced with public defenders for misconduct or disruption of trial proceedings. Likewise, it
must contemplate circumstances under which defense counsel may withdraw. Third, the IHT’s
directive must also contemplate specific parameters governing the replacement of counsel when
confronted with the case of the withdrawal or removal of defense counsel.199 For example, the
tribunal may wish to place limitations on the counsel’s ability to withdraw at least until the
replacement is counsel is assigned to the defendant.
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Fourth, the IHT’s directive must properly allocate responsibility for costs and
expenses.200 The costs and expenses are met by the Tribunal in the ICTY, ICTR, and SCSL
since these directives dealt mainly with establishing a procedure for assigning defense counsel to
indigent defendants. In the IHT context, however, assigning defense counsel to a defendant who
could otherwise retain a counsel of his choice might call for a different allocation of costs.
Nevertheless, the IHT should keep in mind that any allocation of costs and expenses to a
defendant must accompany some form of the right to choose counsel. Lastly, the IHT’s directive
must reiterate the level of competence expected of defense attorneys as well as the scope of their
legal representation.201
c. Need for a High Standard of Qualifications
Rule 30, fourth paragraph of the IHT’s Rules obligates the Director of the Defense Office
to “select a highly qualified criminal Defense counsel” to provide effective defense.202 Yet, the
IHT’s Rules are silent on what ‘highly qualified’ entails. Likewise, the selection criteria for
Non-Iraqi Advisors/Experts, whose role is restricted in the IHT,203 does not provide adequate
guidelines. The standard of competence for Non-Iraqi Advisors/Experts is “based upon their
criminal law experience in their respective countries,…extensive knowledge or experience in
international war crimes trials, [and exhibiting] high moral character and integrity.”204 The IHT
must set a high standard of qualifications for its defense attorneys.
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Rule 22, paragraph 1 of the ICC’s Rules of Procedure and Evidence details the
qualifications of the defense counsel:
[a] counsel for the defense shall have established competence in international or
criminal law and procedure, as well as the necessary relevant practice, whether as
judge, prosecutor, advocate or in other similar capacity, in criminal proceedings.
A counsel for the defense shall have an excellent knowledge of and be fluent in at
least one of the working languages of the Court. Counsel for the defense may be
assisted by persons, including professors of law, with relevant expertise.205
Likewise, the ICTY, ICTR, and SCSL rules and regulatory directives require (1) fluency in at
least one of the working languages of Court; (2) 7-10 years of relevant practice experience in
criminal law, international law, international humanitarian law, or international human rights law;
and (3) admission to practice law in a State.206 In addition, the international criminal tribunals
closely scrutinize the prospective counsel’s past record of professional or other misconduct,
which may include criminal convictions.207
d. Standby Counsel to Safeguard Effective Assistance of Counsel
A high standard for attorney qualifications ensure that defendants are represented by
competent counsel who satisfy minimum international human rights standards. However, a
qualified counsel does not necessarily mean an effective counsel. For example, a newly assigned
counsel during an ongoing trial may not be able to effectively assist his client if he has not been
present in the courtroom or does not know the defense strategy. In the IHT context, this scenario
came into fruition when Judge Rahman promptly replaced the Saddam Hussein’s defense team
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on January 29, 2006 with a new team of six court-appointed lawyers, who sat silently as the trial
proceeded.208
The IHT must institute a regime to properly safeguard effective assistance of counsel
when assigning public defenders. One option is to grant additional time to newly assigned
lawyers so that they may adequately prepare for trial. There are, however, a number of
drawbacks to this option. First, this solution automatically builds in delay to the trial
proceedings. Second, it is hard to determine the exact time needed for adequate preparation
because of the factors involved. For example, a defendant’s unwillingness to cooperate might
impede the counsel’s ability to prepare adequately. More alarmingly, this option presents a
potential for abuse since unscrupulous defendants are able to use it to their advantage.
Another option, though more costly, is to employ standby counsel to better promote
effective assistance of counsel when assigning new defense counsel. Although standby counsel
has been employed most famously in the Milosevic trial, standby judges have historically been
employed since the Nuremberg trials. In addition to not introducing unnecessary delay, the
employment of standby counsel has a number of benefits. First, if the newly appointed counsel
is present in the courtroom throughout the trial, the nature of his preparedness might be
significantly different from someone who reads the transcripts only. Second, a standby counsel
who is present in the courtroom during the trial may be able to better elicit meaningful
cooperation from the defendant. Moreover, the IHT, and not the defendant, has control of the
process. Lastly, establishment of standby counsel reinforces IHT’s conviction to do everything
in their power to ensure a fair trial.
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IV. CONCLUSION
The right to a fair trial is a basic human right. Furthermore, in an adversarial process, the
right to counsel preserves the legitimacy of the tribunal by protecting the defendant’s right to a
fair trial. In addition, the right to counsel guaranteed in various international treaties and
national constitutions, means more than the right to have a lawyer present in the courtroom.
Thus, when the international community prosecutes those responsible for atrocity crimes, it is
critical to ensure that retribution occurs within the constraints of a fair trial.Interrelated
procedural protections further safeguard the substantive right to counsel. This memorandum
focuses on the scope of the IHT’s authority to assign defense counsel when privately retained
counsel misbehaves so that it does not violate international law.
When assigning defense counsel in accordance with international law, the IHT must
balance the defendant’s right to counsel on the one hand and the need to safeguard the overall
integrity and fairness of the proceedings on the other. When privately retained defense attorneys
walk out in contempt of the Court or threaten to boycott the proceedings without sufficient cause,
the IHT may assign public defenders in place of privately retained counsel in the interests of
justice. However, the IHT must take a number of steps before wielding this power. First, the
IHT must establish a transparent procedure on the assignment of counsel, which provides
adequate notice to the defendant. Second, the IHT must make clear the level of proficiency
required for a defense counsel, and if possible, constitute a high standard of qualification. Lastly,
the IHT should consider instituting a standby counsel to avoid any unnecessary delay and
potential prejudice against the defendant during trial.
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